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I. OVERVIEW.
A. Inclusion of Mortqage in Basis.
1. Generally, the original basis of property
purchased is its cost. Sec. 1012, I.R.C.
a. The cost of property is the amount paid for
such property in cash or other property (at its fair market
value). Reg. §1.1012-1(a).
b. Therefore, where a purchaser acquires
property by personally assuming an existing mortgage liability,
or taking subject to such mortgage debt, the purchaser's basis
for such property generally includes the amount of the mortgage
debt. See Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); Denver & Rio
Grande Western R.R. Co. v. U.S., 505 F.2d 1266 (Ct. Cl. 1974);
and Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (CAl 1950). See also U.S. v.
Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938); and Stollberg Hardware v. Comm'r,
46 B.T.A. 788 (1942).
c. EXAMPLE: If a purchaser acquires real
property encumbered by a $300,000 mortgage by personally assuming
such mortgage and paying the seller $100,000 cash, the
purchaser's basis for the property is $400,000.
2. This general rule also applies to taxpayers who
acquire encumbered property by inheritance. In Crane v. Comm'r,
331 U.S. 1 (1947), the Supreme Court held that, where the
taxpayer acquired property subject to a mortgage by inheritance
from her husband, the taxpayer's basis for such property was its
fair market value at the decedent's date of death (including the
mortgage), not just the fair market value of decedent's equity in
the property.
3. While the basis of property purchased with
mortgage financing includes valid liabilities incurred (which
term "incurred" includes assumed or taken subject to) in
acquiring the property, cost basis does not include any liability
if the payment thereof is speculative, contingent or indefinite
in nature. See Mayerson v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 340 (1966); and
Waddell v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 848 (1986).
a. For example, a note is contingent and
indefinite, and not includible in basis, if repayment can be
accomplished only from future profits, which are speculative in
nature. Rev. Rul. 80-235, 1980-2 C.B. 229.
b. Waddell v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 848 (1986), is
illustrative of this point. In that case, the taxpayer purchased
four medical equipment franchises. Each franchise included one
of the seller/franchisor's computerized electrocardiogram
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terminals. The taxpayer paid $6,000 cash and executed a $25,000
promissory note for each franchise and terminal. The note was
for a 7-year term and was labeled "recourse"; however, the
taxpayer's only obligation during the initial 7-year term was to
make a minimum payment of $1,500 per year, which was denominated
as interest at the stated rate of 6% of the stated principal
amount of $25,000. Any payments of principal prior to maturity
would come only from the seller/franchisor's right to 50% of the
taxpayer's net profits from each franchise. The notes could be
renewed for an additional 7-year period, so long as the taxpayer
renewed the franchise. In addition, for the payment of $1,000
during the extended term, the taxpayer could convert each note to
a "nonrecourse" status.
(1) The Court held, among other things,
that the $25,000 notes could not be treated as true indebtedness
for tax purposes, and thus were not includible in the taxpayer's
basis for the franchises, because the likelihood that the notes
would be paid was (based on their own terms) too speculative.
(2) The Court indicated that adequate
security at the inception of the transaction alone does not
guarantee that the loans will be recognized for Federal income
tax purposes. Rather, the proper focus in determining the
likelihood of payment is "to look at the transaction based on the
facts and circumstances at its inception -- including reasonable
revenue projections based on objective criteria and the value of
the security at the time the lender has a right to proceed
against the security for payment -- and determine whether it is
likely that the note will be paid."
(3) Because the Court could not conclude at
the outset of the transaction that payment of any note was
likely, it held that the notes were too speculative to be
recognized for Federal income tax purposes, and so could not be
included in basis. Apparently, although the taxpayer paid
$27,500 for each ECG terminal, the value of each was only $6,500,
and, given the relevant market for such franchises, no reasonable
projection of revenue and expense could indicate that the
taxpayer's franchises would generate enough cash so that the
notes were likely to be paid.
B. Effect of Mortgage on Income and Basis.
1. When an owner of real property places a mortgage
on that property in order to secure borrowed funds, he realizes
no immediate tax consequences.
a. This is so even though the mortgage is in
excess of his basis in the property. See, e._., Woodsam
Associates v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 357 (CA2 1952).
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b. EXAMPLE: Assume that a taxpayer owns real
property worth $200,000 and places a new mortgage thereon of
$130,000 in order to pay off a prior loan of $50,000. Subject to
the rules on interest tracing under Sec. 163, I.R.C., the mere
placement of the new debt has no tax consequences, even though
the taxpayer pockets $80,000.
2. The foregoing is not an evasion or avoidance of
any income tax, but is merely a deferral, for when a taxpayer
sells or otherwise disposes of real property, the amount realized
is equal to-the cash or other property (at its fair market value)
received plus the amount of any outstanding unpaid principal
mortgage liability that the purchaser assumes or to which he
takes subject. Regs. §§l.1001-1(a) and 1.1001-2(a)(1). See also
Chilincirian v. Comm'r, 918 F.2d 1251 (CA6 1990).
a. In determining gain or loss, the seller
offsets against the amount realized his adjusted basis for the
property, which, as discussed above, included the amount of any
mortgage liability on the property when it was acquired. See
Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); and Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S.
300 (1983).
b. EXAMPLE: Assume a taxpayer purchases real
property for $100,000 cash and agrees personally to assume an
existing $300,000 mortgage. If the taxpayer later sells the
property for $200,000 cash and the buyer either assumes, or takes
the property subject to, the same, unreduced mortgage, then the
taxpayer's amount realized is $500,000 ($200,000 cash plus
$300,000 mortgage liability). Assuming that the property is not
depreciable and that there were no other basis adjustments, the
taxpayer would have a $100,000 gain (amount realized, $500,000,
less adjusted basis, $400,000, equals $100,000).
3. Any payments made by the mortgagor on the
principal amount of the mortgage are treated only as debt
reduction payments. Such payments have no effect upon basis (see
Blackstone Theater Co. v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 801 (1949)), and,
further, are not deductible.
4. The transferor of property to another entity must
be wary of adverse tax consequences, which often are a pothole
for the unvigilant.
a. For example, a subsequent transfer of real
property with a mortgage in excess of adjusted basis to a
corporation will cause the taxpayer to recognize gain at least
equal to the amount of such excess. Sec. 357(c), I.R.C. If the
placement of the mortgage and subsequent transfer to the
corporation were for a principal purpose of avoiding Federal
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income tax or, if not, were not for a bona fide business purpose,
the entire principal amount of the liability and any other
liabilities transferred at that time (and not just the excess
over adjusted basis) would be considered gain recognized. Sec.
357(b), I.R.C.
b. As another example, while the contribution of
real property with a mortgage in excess of basis generally does
not cause a contributing partner directly to recognize gain (Sec.
721, I.R.C.), the contributing partner may be required to
recognize gain if the amount of the contributing partner's
liabilities deemed to be assumed or taken subject to by the
remaining partners is in excess of the contributing partner's
basis in his partnership interest. Secs. 752(b) and 731(a) (1),
I.R.C. See Stackhouse v. Comm'r, 441 F.2d 465 (CA5 1971). See
also Newman Estate v. Comm'r, 934 F.2d 426 (CA2 1991), rev'g 59
TCM 543 (1990); but see Gershkowitz v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 984
(1987).
c. Not only may the unwary contributing partner
be required to recognize gain, but, under certain circumstances,
the existing partners of the same partnership will recognize gain
as well. For example, the Service has ruled that, where a new
partner joins an existing partnership that has outstanding lia-
bilities and unrealized receivables, the existing partners are
treated as having received distributions for which ordinary in-
come must be recognized to the extent that such partners' shares
of the partnership's unrealized receivables are reduced. See
Rev. Rul. 84-102, 1984-2 C.B. 119.
5. A mortgage placed on property after it has been
acquired does not increase the owner's basis in the property.
See, e.g., Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 357 (CA2
1952).
a. If the mortgage proceeds are used to improve
the property, the basis of the property is increased by the cost
of the improvements. Blake v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 546 (1947).
b. This is because the cost of the improvements
is a capitalized expenditure which increases basis, and the fact
that borrowed funds were used is immaterial.
6. As noted, the practical effect that a subsequent
real property mortgage has on income and basis is to postpone the
recognition of any economic gain or loss realized from the
property at the time the property becomes encumbered by the
mortgage (that is, the mortgage proceeds) to the time when the
property is sold or otherwise disposed of.
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a. EXAMPLE: Assume that a taxpayer bought real
property in early 1987 for $400,000 cash. Also assume that the
property is now worth $600,000, and that the taxpayer places a
$500,000 mortgage on the property. Although the taxpayer has
immediate use of the full amount of the mortgage proceeds, the
taxpayer has also incurred an obligation to repay the $500,000;
therefore, the taxpayer has realized no gain on the borrowing.
If the taxpayer later sells the property for $600,000, payable
$100,000 in cash and the assumption of the mortgage, the taxpayer
will have a total gain of $200,000. See, e.g., Allan v. Comm'r,
86 T.C. 655 (1986); Mendham Corp. v. Comm'r, 9 T.C. 320 (1947);
and Lutz & Schram Co. v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 682 (1943).
b. Thus, the placing of the mortgage allowed the
taxpayer to receive part of the property's appreciation without
tax consequence until the later sale.
II. CANCELLATION OR REDUCTION OF PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF MORTGAGE.
A. Impact on Mortgagor.
1. In general, any reduction in the principal amount
of the mortgage by compromise or negotiation, or other benefit of
debt relief by modification of the mortgage terms -- in the
absence of a mortgage foreclosure, voluntary conveyance of a deed
in lieu of such foreclosure or abandonment -- will cause the
mortgagor to recognize cancellation of indebtedness income,
taxable at ordinary rates, to the extent of the cancellation.
Sec. 61(a) (12), I.R.C. See U.S. v. Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. 1
(1931); and B. F. Avery & Sons, Inc. v. Comm'r, 26 B.T.A. 1393
(1932). See also Republic Supply Co. v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 446
(1976). See, generally, Tucker, The Real Property Owner in
Default: The Income Tax Consequences, 3 J. Real Est. Tax. 5
(1975); and Axelrod and Fetter, Amount and Type of Taxable Gain
on Real Estate Foreclosures Can Be Controlled by the Parties, 18
Tax. for Law. 146 (1989).
a. The forgiveness of a debt is considered to
occur when it becomes reasonable to assume that the debt will
probably never be paid. See Bear Manufacturing Co. v. U.S., 430
F.2d 152 (CA7 1970); and Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v.
Comm'r, 23 T.C. 527 (1954).
b. In fact, the Tax Court has held that
cancellation of indebtedness income was not recognized by a
taxpayer who would not accept forgiveness from his debts while he
was living. Estate of Marcus v. Comm'r, 34 TCM 38 (1975).
2. There are a number of exceptions to this general
rule.
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a. One significant exception to the general rule
provides that no cancellation of indebtedness income results
where the debt is discharged in a title 11 case. Sec.
108(a) (1) (A), I.R.C. (A "title 11 case" is a case under title 11
of the United States Code, but only if the taxpayer is under the
jurisdiction of the court in such case and the discharge of
indebtedness is granted by the court or is pursuant to a plan
approved by the court. Sec. 108(d) (2), I.R.C.)
(1) This exception was added to the Code by
Congress to accommodate Federal bankruptcy policy and Federal
income tax policy. See H.R. Rep. No. 833, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
at 8-9 (1980); and S. Rep. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 9-10
(1980).
(2) By legislatively determining that a
debtor coming out of bankruptcy is not burdened with an immediate
tax liability, Congress preserved the bankruptcy law's policy of
giving such a debtor a fresh start.
(3) Upon the filing of a title 11 case
(chapter 7 or chapter 11), the individual debtor is deemed to
transfer all of his or her assets to the bankruptcy estate. Such
transfer is generally nontaxable, and the bankruptcy estate
assumes the tax attributes of the debtor. See Sec. 1398, I.R.C.
(a) Transfers between the individual
debtor and the bankruptcy estate are both treated in the same
manner. Sec. 1398(f), I.R.C.
(i) A transfer of an asset by the
debtor to the estate -- other than by sale or exchange -- is not
treated as a disposition of the asset, and the estate is treated
as the debtor would be treated as to such asset. Sec.
1398(f) (1), I.R.C.
(ii) On termination of the estate,
any transfer of an asset by the estate to the debtor -- other
than by sale or exchange -- is not treated as a disposition of
the asset, and the debtor is treated as the estate would be
treated as to such asset. Sec. 1398(f) (2), I.R.C.
(b) A partnership is not treated as an
individual; however, the interest in a partnership of an
individual debtor is treated the same as any other asset of the
debtor. Sec. 1398(b)(2), I.R.C.
(c) The taxable income of the estate is
computed in the same manner as for an individual, with the tax
thereon due from the trustee. Sec. 1398(c) (1), I.R.C.
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(i) The tax table used is that
under Sec. 1(d), I.R.C. -- married individuals filing separate
returns. Sec. 1398(c)(2), I.R.C.
(ii) If the estate does not itemize
deductions, the basic standard deduction for the estate is the
same as for a married individual filing a separate return. Sec.
1398(c) (3), I.R.C.
(d) The taxable year of the debtor is
determined without regard to the title 11 case, except that the
debtor may elect to treat his taxable year as two separate
taxable years, the first of which ends on the day before the date
of the title 11 case, and the second of which begins on the
commencement date of the title 11 case. Secs. 1398(d) (1) and
(2)(A), I.R.C. See also Temp. Reg. §7a.2. (issued May 1, 1981).
(i) This election must be made on
or before the due date for the earlier of the two returns; and,
once made, the election is irrevocable. Sec. 1398(d) (2) (D),
I.R.C.
(ii) The debtor cannot make this
election if the debtor has no assets other than exempt property
under sec. 522 of title 11. Sec. 1398(d) (2) (C), I.R.C.
(e) The gross income of the estate for
each taxable year includes the gross income of the debtor to
which the estate is entitled under title 11, except where the
gross income is received or accrued by the debtor prior to the
commencement date of the title 11 case. Sec. 1398(e) (1), I.R.C.
(i) Any item included in the gross
income of the estate is not included in the gross income of the
debtor. Sec. 1398(e) (2), I.R.C.
(ii) The determination of whether
or not any amount paid or incurred by the estate is allowable as
a deduction or credit for income tax purposes or is wages for
employment tax purposes is made as if the amount were paid or
incurred by the debtor and as if the debtor were still engaged in
the trades or businesses, and in the activities, the debtor was
engaged in before the commencement of the title 11 case. Sec.
1398(e) (3), I.R.C.
(f) As set forth in Sec. 1398(g),
I.R.C., the estate succeeds to and takes into account the
following items of the debtor (determined as of the first day of
the debtor's taxable year in which the title 11 case commences):
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(i) The net operating loss
carryovers determined under Sec. 172, I.R.C.
(ii) The carryover of excess
charitable contributions determined under Sec. 170(d)(1), I.R.C.
(iii) Any recovery of tax benefit
items to which the debtor would be entitled under Sec. 11,
I.R.C.
(iv) The carryovers of any credit
and all other items which, but for the commencement of the case,
would be required to be taken into account by the debtor with
respect to any credit.
(v) The capital loss carryover
determined under Sec. 1212, I.R.C.
(vi) As to any asset acquired by
the estate from the debtor, other than by sale or exchange, the
basis, holding period and character such asset had in the hands
of the debtor.
(vii) The method of accounting
used by the debtor.
(viii) Other tax attributes of the
debtor, as provided in Regulations (that are not yet issued).
(g) On termination of the estate, the
debtor, in turn, succeeds to and takes into account the same
items referred to immediately above. Sec. 1398(i), I.R.C.
(h) Administration expenses of the
estate and fees and charges assessed against the estate are
allowed as deductions, to the extent not otherwise disallowed by
the Code. Sec. 1398(h) (1), I.R.C.
(i) These items may be carried
forward or carried back by the estate. Sec. 1398(h) (2), I.R.C.
(ii) On termination of the estate,
the debtor cannot pick up these deductions to the extent not
utilized by the estate. Sec. 1398(h)(2)(D), I.R.C.
(i) Sec. 1398 does not apply if the
chapter 7 or chapter 11 proceeding is dismissed. Sec.
1398(b)'(1), I.R.C.
b. A debtor also need not recognize discharge of
indebtedness income where such debtor is insolvent both before
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and after cancellation of the debt. Sec. 108(a) (1) (B), I.R.C.
See also Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Comm'r, 70
F.2d 95 (CA5 1934); Danenberg v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 370 (1979); and
Lakeland Grocery Co. v. Comm'r, 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937).
(1) "Insolvency" is defined as the excess of
liabilities over the fair market value of assets. With respect
to any discharge, whether or not the taxpayer is insolvent, and
the amount by which the taxpayer is insolvent, is determined on
the basis of the taxpayer's assets and liabilities immediately
before the discharge. Sec. 108(d) (3), I.R.C. See also Estate of
Marcus v. Comm'r, 34 TCM 38 (1975).
(a) Thus, whether a taxpayer is
insolvent for purposes of this exception is determined according
to the taxpayer's balance sheet, and the mere ability of a
taxpayer to pay his debts when they become due does not
disqualify him from being deemed insolvent. See, e.g., Brutsche
v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 1034 (1976) (holding that a corporation was
solvent after a forgiveness of indebtedness because cash proceeds
received in a settlement of a suit for damages resulting from
lost profits were to be treated as an asset of the corporation in
determining its solvency).
(b) In Estate of Marcus, supra, the
Court held that assets exempt from the claims of creditors under
state law are not to be included among the taxpayer's assets in
determining whether assets exceed liabilities. See also Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 9125010 (March 19, 1984) (under which the Service found
that the taxpayer's personal residence and other property exempt
from creditors under state law should be disregarded in the
determination of the extent to which the taxpayer was insolvent);
and Hunt v. Comm'r, 57 TCM 919 (1989).
(2) The amount excluded from income for
purposes of the "insolvency exception" is limited to the amount
by which taxpayer is insolvent. Sec. 108(a) (3), I.R.C.
3. Taxpayers having debts discharged pursuant to
either the title 11 bankruptcy exception or the insolvency
exception, though not required to recognize discharge of
indebtedness income, are required to reflect such discharge in
their overall tax status through a reduction in overall tax
attributes. See Sec. 108(b), I.R.C.
a. Unless the taxpayer elects first to reduce
the basis of his depreciable assets by the amount excluded from
gross income, the taxpayer is required to reduce, by the amount
of the discharged debt, net operating losses and net operating
loss carryovers, general business credit carryovers under Sec.
38, I.R.C., capital losses and capital loss carryovers under Sec.
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1212, I.R.C., asset bases and foreign tax credit carryovers under
Sec. 27, I.R.C., in that order. Secs. 108(b) (1) and (2)(A)
through (E), I.R.C.
b. While most tax attributes are generally
reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis, the necessary reductions in
a taxpayer's credit carryovers (that is, general business credit
carryovers under Sec. 38 and foreign tax credit carryovers under
Sec. 27) are only reduced by 33-1/3 cents for each dollar of the
discharged debt. Secs. 108(b)(3)(A) and .(B), I.R.C.
4. Rather than have certain tax attributes reduced by
the amount of the discharged debt, a taxpayer who is seeking a
discharge in bankruptcy or due to insolvency may instead elect to
reduce the adjusted bases of certain depreciable property. Secs.
108(b) (5) and 1017, I.R.C.
a. The amount of the reduction in basis is
limited to the aggregate adjusted bases of the taxpayer's
depreciable property as of the beginning of the taxable year
following the taxable year in which the discharge occurs. Sec.
108(b) (5) (B), I.R.C.
b. For purposes of basis reduction, the Service
has ruled that a partnership is an individual for purposes of
Sections 108 and 1017. Rev. Rul. 72-205, 1972-1 C.B. 37.
(1) For a detailed discussion of the
statutory rules of Secs. 108(b)(5) and 1017, see Pollack, How
Section 108 Permits Debt Cancellation Income to Be Minimized, 62
J. Tax. 276 (1985).
(2) As to the rules for a timely election
and consent, see Reg. S 1.108(a)-2, noting that the consent must
be made on IRS Form 982.
c. Furthermore, the basis reduction election
only applies to income from the discharge of indebtedness, not
income from a sale or exchange of property, such as that which
may occur in a repossession or foreclosure. See Estate of Delman
v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 15 (1979).
d. Moreover, where the taxpayer attempts to vary
the general basis reduction rules (Reg. §1.1017-1), the Service's
Regulations (Reg. §1.1017-2) and Revenue Procedures (see Rev.
Proc. 78-15, 1978-2 C.B. 488 (as to stock), and Rev. Proc.
85-44, 1985-2 C.B. 504 (as to depreciable property)) should be
referred to and closely followed.
e. Finally, where the basis reduction election
is made, the rules regarding the reduction of the taxpayer's tax
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attributes will only be applied after the bases of the taxpayer's
depreciable assets have been reduced to zero and some discharge
income remains. Sec. 108(b) (5) (C), I.R.C. For a detailed
discussion, see Asofsky and Tatlock, Bankruptcy Tax Act Radically
Alters Treatment of Bankruptcy and Discharging Debts, 54 J. Tax.
106 (1981).
5. Prior to December 31, 1986 taxpayers need not have
recognized cancellation of indebtedness income if the
indebtedness discharged was a "qualified business indebtedness".
Former Sec. 108(a) (1) (C), I.R.C.
a. An indebtedness for these purposes was only a
"qualified business indebtedness" if the indebtedness was
incurred or assumed by a corporation or by an individual, where
such debt was incurred or assumed in connection with property
used in the individual's trade or business, and the corporate or
individual taxpayer made an election with respect to such
indebtedness. Former Sec. 108(d)(4), I.R.C.
b. Where the "qualified business indebtedness"
exception applied, the adjusted bases of the taxpayer's
depreciable property were reduced by the amount of the debt
discharged. Former Sec. 108(c), I.R.C. The bases of the
taxpayer's assets were reduced according to Sec. 1017, I.R.C.,
and the amount of such reduction was limited to the aggregate
adjusted bases of the depreciable property held by the taxpayer
as of the beginning of the taxable year following the taxable
year in which the debt was discharged. Former Sec. 108(c),
I.R.C.
c. Effective with respect to discharges of
indebtedness occurring after December 31, 1986, the "qualified
business indebtedness" exception was revoked by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986.
6. There is no cancellation of indebtedness income
where the forgiveness is intended as a gift. See Helverin v.
American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943), as modified by Comm'r
v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949). See also Sutphin v. U.S., 14
Cl. Ct. 545, 88-1 U.S.T.C. 9,269 (Cl. Ct. 1988), which held that
a discounted prepayment of a mortgage was considered discharge of
indebtedness income, rather than a gift, because it resulted from
a creditor's business judgment.
a. This exception is usually applicable only in
the family gift situation. But see Hartland Associates v.
Comm'r, 54 T.C. 1580 (1970), and Sec. 118, I.R.C. and Reg.
§1.61-12(a) (dealing with the cancellation of a corporate debt by
a shareholder as a contribution to the capital of a corporation).
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b. While a cancellation of indebtedness intended
as a gift will not result in income to the mortgagor, the
cancellation will cause the mortgagee to recognize income where
the indebtedness cancelled is an installment obligation. Sec.
453B(f), I.R.C.
(1) In this situation, the mortgagee must
recognize gain to the extent that the fair market value of the
obligation exceeds the mortgagor's basis for the installment
note, which is usually the remaining basis of the property. Sec.
453B(a), I.R.C.
(2) This provision generally forces the
mortgagee to recognize the previously deferred gain, such
deferral being permitted by use of the installment method.
7. Where the mortgage debt is a purchase money
mortgage and there is a reduction in the purchaser's obligation,
such reduction does not result in discharge of indebtedness
income; rather, such reduction is treated as a purchase price
reduction and a corresponding reduction in the basis of the
property. Sec. 108(e) (5), I.R.C. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8429001
(March 12, 1984).
a. For this provision to apply, the purchase
money debt must be owed to the seller/creditor of the property
and the debtor can be neither insolvent nor in bankruptcy under
title 11. Secs. 108(e)(5)(A) and (B), I.R.C.
(1) While not currently supported by the
Code or case law, it would be logical for this provision to apply
to the estate or beneficiary of a deceased seller.
(2) See Sec. 1038(g), I.R.C., which made
Sec. 1038, I.R.C. applicable to the estate or beneficiary of a
deceased seller because Congress felt that an estate or
beneficiary should be entitled to the same treatment as if the
decedent seller had survived. Installment Sales Revision Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-471, Sec. 4.
b. Interestingly enough, prior to the enactment
of Sec. 108(e) (5), courts held that, where there was a reduction
in the unpaid principal amount of the mortgage, which adjustment
was an adjustment in the purchase price of the property to
reflect a revaluation of the property, or a loss in value, the
debt cancellation could be treated as a reduction in basis to the
purchaser, and not as taxable income, regardless of whether the
purchase money debt was:
(1) Owed directly to the seller (see
Helvering v. A. L. Killian Co., 128 F.2d 433 (CA8 1942)), or
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(2) Owed to a third-party creditor who
financed the purchase. See Hirsch v. Comm'r, 115 F.2d 656 (CA7
1940). But see Fifth Avenue Fourteenth Street Corp. v. Comm'r,
147 F.2d 453 (CA2 1944) (limiting Hirsch to direct negotiations
regarding purchase price with the seller); and Rev. Rul. 82-202,
1982-2 C.B. 35.
c. In Rev. Rul. 91-31, 1991-20 I.R.B. 4, the
Service held that a reduction in principal of a nonrecourse debt
by a holder who was not the original seller of the property
results in the realization of discharge of indebtedness income by
the debtor, irrespective of whether the fair market value of the
property is greater than or less than the balance of the debt at
the time of the principal reduction.
(1) The holding in Rev. Rul. 91-31 amplified
Rev. Rul. 82-202, 1982-2 C.B 35, in which the Service ruled that
a reduction in debt, whether recourse or nonrecourse, results in
the realization of income by the debtor under Sec. 61(a) (12),
I.R.C., if, at the time of the reduction, the fair market value
of the property is greater than the principal balance of the
debt.
(2) The Service expressly rejected the
holding in Fulton Gold Corp. v. Comm'r, 31 B.T.A. 519 (1934), in
which the Board of Tax Appeals held that the satisfaction of a
nonrecourse mortgage for an amount less than its face amount
results in a reduction of the mortgagor's basis in the underlying
property rather than the realization of income. See also Comm'r
v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983); and Gershkowitz v. Comm'r, 88 T.C.
984 (1987). But see, for a variation of Gershkowitz, Newman
Estate v. Comm'r, 934 F.2d 426 (CA2 1991), rev'g 59 TCM 543
(1990).
8. A taxpayer who issues new debt in satisfaction of
old indebtedness will be treated as having satisfied such old
indebtedness with an amount of money equal to the "issue price"
of the new debt. Sec. 108(e) (11), I.R.C.
a. Under Sec. 108(e)(11) (B), the issue price is
determined under Secs. 1273 and 1274, I.R.C., relating to
original issue discount.
(1) If either the new debt or the old debt
is publicly traded, the "issue price" of the new debt is equal to
its fair market value. Sec. 1273(b) (3), I.R.C.
(2) If neither debt instrument is publicly
traded, the issue price of the new debt is equal to its stated
principal amount or, where it does not provide "adequate"
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interest, a lower imputed principal amount, as determined under
Sec. 1274(b), I.R.C. Sec. 1274(a), I.R.C.
a. A debt instrument will be deemed to
provide for adequate interest if interest accrues at a rate at
least equal to the applicable Federal rate, as defined under Sec.
1274(d), I.R.C.
b. The imputed principal amount is
equal to the sum of the present values of all payments due under
the debt instruments, except in the case of "potentially abusive
situations" (as defined under Sec. 1274(b) (3) (B), I.R.C.), under
which the imputed principal amount is equal to the fair market
value of the property for which the debt instrument was issued,
adjusted to take into account other considerations involved in
the transaction. Sec. 1274(b), I.R.C.
(3) The corporate reorganization exception
of Sec. 1275(a) (4) has been repealed and, as a result, a taxpayer
which issues new debt instruments in connection with a Sec.
368(a)(1)(E) recapitalization may incur cancellation of
indebtedness income and/or original issue discount income.
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, Sec.
11325.
b. A debt instrument is viewed as being
exchanged for a new debt instrument if the new debt instrument
differs "materially either in kind or in extent" from the old
debt instrument. Reg. §1.1001-1(a). See also Burstein, Federal
Taxation of Debt Swaps and Modifications, 17 J. Corp. Tax. 3
(Spring 1990).
(1) A change or substitution of obligors
generally constitutes a material modification. Rev. Rul. 78-408,
1978-2 C.B. 203; and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8848051 (September 7, 1988).
But see Rev. Rul. 82-122, 1982-1 C.B. 80 (substitution and
release of the original obligor of an installment note and a
change in interest rate did not constitute an exchange because
the noteholder's right to payments were neither eliminated nor
materially altered); see also Rev. Rul. 68-419, 1968-2 C.B. 196
(payment deferrals for 5 years and interest rate increase did not
cause disposition of installment note); Rev. Rul. 74-157, 1974-1
C.B. 115; and Rev. Rul. 75-457, 1795-2 C.B. 196.
(2) A change in the interest rate, unless
minimal, will generally constitute a material modification of the
debt instrument. Rev. Rul. 89-122, 1989-2 C.B. 200 (holding that
a United States commercial bank was, as a result, entitled to
recognize a loss on a debt modification by a foreign country);
and Rev. Rul. 87-19, 1987-1 C.B. 249 (ruling that a waiver of the
right to receive a higher interest rate under an interest rate
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adjustment clause was a material change). See also Prop. Reg.
§i.1274-1(c) (2), Example. But see Rev. Rul. 82-122, supra
(increased interest rate on installment note assumed by new
obligor not considered exchange of old installment note for new
note); and Newberry v. Comm'r, 4 TCM 576 (1945) (change in the
interest rate, maturity date and collateral not deemed exchange
of debt instruments).
(3) The deferral of accrued interest likely
would not constitute a material modification of the debt
instrument. See West Missouri Power Co. v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 105
(1952).
(4) A modification of the collateral
securing the indebtedness may be considered material, depending
on other facts and circumstances of the lending transaction. The
following held that the change in the security arrangement was a
material modification: Federal National Mortgage Association v.
Comm'r, 90 T.C. 405 (1990), aff'd 896 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Rev. Rul. 81-169, 1981-1 C.B. 429 (the elimination of a sinking
fund); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9037009 (June 12, 1990); and Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 8907049 (November 23, 1989). But see Rev. Rul. 77-416,
1977-2 C.B. 34; and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8346104 (August 18, 1983).
(5) A reduction or other adjustment of the
principal balance of the indebtedness is generally considered a
material modification, but may be treated as a purchase price
reduction under Sec. 108(e) (5), as discussed above. See Rev.
Rul. 89-122, supra.
(6) A change in the maturity date of a debt
obligation is generally not considered a material modification of
the underlying instrument. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9037009 (June 12,
1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8928049 (April 18, 1989); and Rev. Rul.
73-160, 1973-1 C.B. 365 (change in the maturity date, together
with the modification of the security arrangement, did not
constitute a material modification). But see Rev. Rul. 81-169,
supra (a change in maturity date together with a change in the
collateral security constituted a material modification).
(7) A modification of the type of instrument
may be considered material. See Johnson v. U.S., 78-2 U.S.T.C.
9,609 (M.D. Tenn. 1978), aff'd 81-1 U.S.T.C. 9,298 (CA6 1980)
(exchange of demand note for fixed longer term debenture was mere
substitution for equal value). But see Watson v. Comm'r, 8 T.C.
569 (1947) (exchange of note for bond with same interest rate but
different maturity date).
9. There is no cancellation of indebtedness income
where the debtor performs services in full or partial
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satisfaction of the debt, which services have a fair market value
equal to the debt satisfied.
a. The rationale for this exception appears to
be that the mortgagor does not realize any economic benefit on a
release of previously encumbered assets because the mortgagor has
in reality paid for the debt with human capital.
b. In any event, while the mortgagor has no
income from the cancellation of the debt, the mortgagor has
realized compensation income in the amount of the debt satisfied,
which is included in the mortgagor's gross income. Reg.
§1. 61-12 (a) .
10. A cash-basis taxpayer is not required to recognize
discharge of indebtedness income where the payment of the debt
would have been deductible by the payor. Sec. 108(e)(2), I.R.C.
a. For example, the forgiveness of a trade
payable by a creditor or the forgiveness of accrued wages by an
employee of the debtor would not give rise to income upon
discharge of such liabilities.
b. In contrast, an accrual-basis taxpayer is
required to recognize discharge of indebtedness income when the
debt is forgiven to offset the tax effect of previously accrued
deductions.
11. The release of collateral securing an obligation
does not, in and of itself, create income in the absence of a
reduction or cancellation of the underlying debt. See Estate of
Whitthorne v. Comm'r, 44 B.T.A. 1234 (1941).
a. The release of a contingent liability to
contribute capital to a partnership does not give rise to
cancellation of indebtedness income. Hunt v. Comm'r, 59 TCM 635
(1990).
b. Similarly, the release of guarantors of a
loan, who are secondarily liable thereon, does not generate
cancellation of indebtedness income to such guarantors. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 7953004 (September 7, 1979). But see Tennessee
Securities v. Comm'r, 37 TCM 1803 (1978), aff'd 674 F.2d 570 (CA6
1982), in which guarantors who were called upon to pay the
guarantee obligation which was ultimately paid by the guarantors'
closely-held corporation realized dividend income.
12. The general rule of cancellation of indebtedness
income and the exceptions thereto apply only to a cancellation of
indebtedness, or a satisfaction of a mortgage at less than its
face amount. The tax consequences to a mortgagor or debtor which
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result from foreclosure, voluntary conveyance in lieu thereof or
abandonment are governed by different rules.
B. Impact on Mortgagee.
1. Where there is a cancellation of indebtedness or a
satisfaction of a mortgage debt at less than its face amount, and
there is no mortgage foreclosure, deed in lieu thereof or
abandonment, the mortgagee will realize a loss to the extent
that its tax basis for the debt exceeds the amount actually paid
by the mortgagor.
a. This loss is deductible whether or not the
mortgagor is able to repay the mortgage debt in full and whether
or not the value of the mortgaged property has increased or
decreased. See Smith v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 872 (1967), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part on other issues 424 F.2d 219 (CA9 1970).
b. Note, however, that, if the mortgage note
were issued, taken or acquired at a discount, the mortgagee could
have a gain, rather than a loss, on the debt settlement. This
would occur if the settlement were for an amount more than the
tax basis for the note, although less than the face amount.
c. EXAMPLE: Assume that a taxpayer purchases a
$100,000 face value mortgage note at a time when the market rate
of interest is greater than the mortgage note's stated rate of
interest. Also assume that, because of this differential in
interest rates, the taxpayer is able to purchase the note for
$90,000. If the taxpayer later agrees to accept $95,000 from the
mortgagor as a final settlement for the mortgage debt, the
taxpayer would have a $5,000 gain. The character of this gain is
determined under Sec. 1276, I.R.C. In general, to the extent
that such gain reflects that the debt was issued at an interest
rate below the market interest rate, such income is ordinary in
character. Sec. 1276(a), I.R.C. See, generally, Auster, Market
Discount Elections with Respect to Bonds after the Tax Reform Act
of 1984, 63 Taxes 111 (1985).
2. A corporate mortgagee always has a business bad
debt, resulting in ordinary loss treatment. Secs. 166(a) and
166(d), I.R.C. See, e._., West Coast Securities Co. v. Comm'r,
14 T.C. 947 (1950). But see, with regard to the loss deduction
under Sec. 165, I.R.C., International Trading Co. v. Comm'r, 484
F.2d 707 (CA7 1973), rev'g 57 T.C. 455 (1971) (holding that a
corporation could not take a loss deduction under Sec. 165(a),
I.R.C. as to property neither used in a trade or business nor
held for production of income). See also Schautz Co. v. U.S.,
567 F.2d 373 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (denying a loss deduction on the sale
of residential vacation property on the theory that Sec. 274
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overrides Sec. 165, I.R.C.); and Blake Construction Co., Inc. v.
U.s., 572 F.2d 823 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
3. A non-corporate mortgagee may receive ordinary
loss treatment, but only if the debt was a business debt. Sec.
166(d)(1), I.R.C.
a. A business debt is either a debt created or
acquired in connection with a trade or business of the taxpayer
or a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in
the taxpayer's trade or business. Sec. 166(d) (2), I.R.C.
b. The characterization of a worthless debt as
business or nonbusiness is a question of fact which depends on
the relationship between the debt and the creditor's trade or
business. The test for determining what constitutes a "trade or
business" for purposes of applying Sec. 166 is the same as that
used for ascertaining the deductibility of a loss under Sec. 165
-- that is, whether the loss is proximately related to the
conduct of the trade or business of the taxpayer. Reg. §1.166-
5(b).
c. The issue of whether an individual has
incurred a business bad debt or a non-business bad debt has
frequently been litigated. In 1963, the Supreme Court attempted,
although inarticulately, to distinguish an investor from a person
engaged in a trade or business. Whipple v. Comm'r, 373 U.S. 193
(1963).
(1) The Court's decision did not,
unfortunately, provide much guidance. Therefore, the various
cases since that time, along with the range of fact patterns on
which these cases have arisen, leaves the area in some doubt.
See, generally, Ohl, The Deduction for Bad Debts: A Study in
Flexibility and Inflexibility, 22 Tax Law 579 (1969); and Tucker,
The Warren Court: Its Impact on the Capital vs. Ordinary Concept
Under the Internal Revenue Code, 17 Kansas L. Rev. 53 (1968).
(2) For example, the Claims Court, on the
third time around for the same case, found that advances by a
taxpayer engaged in the business of rendering financial services
constituted business loans made for the dominant purpose of
advancing the consulting business, so that the subsequent bad
debts were business bad debts. Adelson v. Comm'r, 6 Cl. Ct. 102
(1984). Note that, although the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit affirmed the Claims Court's findings that the taxpayer's
advances were bona fide business debts, the case was remanded
back to the Claims Court for additional factual findings to
support the objective analysis required under U.S. v. Generes,
405 U.S. 93 (1972). Adelson v. Comm'r, 782 F.2d 1010 (CA Fed Cir
1986).
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4. The generally accepted belief that the mere
holding of rental real property constitutes a trade or business
may not be wholly valid, under certain circumstances. See Lee,
"Active Conduct" Distinguished from Conduct of a Rental Real
Estate Business, 25 Tax Lawyer 317 (1972).
a. In contrast, the making of mortgage loans may
constitute an individual's trade or business. If such loans are
made on a frequent and continual basis, then such money lending
may in and of itself constitute a business, so that bad debts
therefrom will constitute ordinary losses. See, e.g., Sales v.
Comm'r, 37 T.C. 576 (1961); and Barish v. Comm'r, 31 T.C. 1280
(1959).
b. As to a partner in a partnership, the type of
business carried on by the partnership, and the ability to cause
attribution of such business to the partner, may be determinant
as to whether a loss on a loan to the partnership is an ordinary
loss or capital loss. See, e.g., Butler v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 1097
(1961); Kazdin v. Comm'r, 28 TCM 432 (1969); and Hambuechen v.
Comm'r, 43 T.C. 80 (1964).
c. See Cary v. Comm'r, 32 TCM 913 (1973), as to
the separation of the individual's activities from those of his
controlled entities in the "dealer" area.
5. Treatment of Bad Debts.
a. Wholly Worthless Bad Debts.
(1) Generally, a bad debt which is wholly
worthless must be deducted in full in the year in which such
worthlessness occurs. Sec. 166(a) (1), I.R.C.; Reg. §1.166-3(b).
(2) The burden of proving worthlessness is
on the taxpayer, and the Service may examine all pertinent
evidence, including the value of the collateral, if any, securing
the debt and the financial condition of the debtor. Reg.
§1.166-2(a).
(3) While the Service is entitled to scru-
tinize closely the taxpayer's documents regarding the debt in
question, the creditor-mortgagee need not be an "incorrigible
optimist", and so legal action to enforce payment is not
necessary where the facts indicate that such action would be
futile. Reg. §1.166-2(b).
(4) The factors considered by the courts or
the Service have included: receivership or bankruptcy of the
debtor; the termination of, or decline in, the debtor's business;
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the debtor's disappearance or departure from the country; and the
debtor's death. See, e.g., Lunsford v. Comm'r, 212 F.2d 878 (CA5
1954); Keller v. Comm'r, 29 TCM 369 (1970); Portland
Manufacturing Co. v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 58 (1971); and Rev. Rul.
71-37, 1971-1 C.B. 78.
b. Partially Worthless Bad Debts.
(1) It is also possible to obtain a
deduction for a partially worthless bad debt. As a general rule,
a partially worthless debt is deductible in the taxable year in
which it is determined that only a portion of the debt is
recoverable; the worthless portion is deductible to the extent
that it is charged off for financial accounting purposes in such
year. Sec. 166(a) (2), I.R.C.; Regs. §§1.166-3(a) (1) and (2).
(2) The worthlessness of the portion
charged off must be established to the satisfaction of the
Service. Reg. §1.166-3(a)(1). See, e.g., Harrington v. Comm'r,
31 TCM 888 (1972); and Bullock v. Comm'r, 26 T.C. 276 (1956),
aff'd per curiam 253 F.2d 215 (CA2 1958).
(3) In this connection, the courts have
held that the determination of the Service, if reasonably based
on the facts, will not be overturned by the courts unless
arbitrary or unreasonable. See, e.g., American ProcessinQ and
Sales Co. v. U.S., 371 F.2d 842 (Ct. Cl. 1967); and Stranahan v.
Comm'r, 42 F.2d 729 (CA6 1930).
(4) Furthermore, where the uncollectible
portion of the debt cannot be clearly ascertained with a high
degree of certainty, the deduction for the partially worthless
debt will be disallowed, even though it can be shown that debt is
truly partially worthless. Reg. §1.166-3(a)(2)(ii). See, e.g.,
First National Bank of Los Angeles v. Comm'r, 6 B.T.A. 850
(1927).
(5) Lack of charge-off is not fatal to the
deduction, but only to the year of deductibility. The bad debt
may be deducted in the year of charge-off, irrespective of
whether the partial worthlessness was ascertained in the year of
charge-off or an earlier year. Reg. §1.166-3(a).
(a) The Regulations note that a
disallowance of a bad debt deduction in one year does not prevent
an allowance of such deduction in a subsequent year, and the
charge-off, although erroneous in the earlier year, will be
deemed to suffice, as to the portion charged off in the earlier
year, in the later year. Reg. §1.166-3(a) (2) (ii).
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(b) The Tax Court has indicated that
partial worthlessness need not be deducted on a year-to-year
basis, but can be deducted through a charge-off in a later year.
See E. Richard Mieniq Co. v. Comm'r, 9 T.C. 976 (1947). See also
Estate of Denton v. Comm'r, 11 TCM 802 (1952).
(c) The burden is on the taxpayer to
prove that a proper charge-off was made. See, e.g., Findley v.
Comm'r, 25 T.C. 311 (1955), aff'd per curiam 236 F.2d 959 (CA3
1956); and Klegberg v. Comm'r, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941).
(d) The entries actually charging off
the partially worthless debt need not be made in the taxable year
for which the deduction is taken, as where the taxpayer's
accountants do not make the charge-off until they close the books
for the year, so long as they are made prior to the filing of the
income tax return for that year. See, e._., Brandtlen &-Kluge,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 416 (1960); Kentucky Rock and Asphalt Co.
v. Helburn, 108 F.2d 779 (CA6 1940); and Colorado County Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 1167 (1961), aff'd 309
F.2d 751 (CA5 1962).
III. MORTGAGOR'S TAX CONSEQUENCES ON FORECLOSURE
A. Sale or Exchange Treatment. A foreclosure (or deed in
lieu of foreclosure or other transfer to lender in full
satisfaction of the debt) is treated, for Federal income tax
purposes, as a sale of property which may give rise to gain or
loss to the mortgagor. See Regs. §§l.1001-2(a) (1) and (2). See
also Helvering v. Hamel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941); and Rev. Rul. 78-
164, 1978-1 C.B. 264.
B. Recourse Debt.
1. Upon the foreclosure of property encumbered by
recourse debt (that is, debt for which the mortgagor is
personally liable), the property is deemed to be sold for its
fair market value.
2. The realized gain is bifurcated between that
portion allocable to the "sale element" of the transaction and
the portion allocable to the "debt cancellation element". See
Michaels v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1412 (1986); and Rev. Rul. 90-16,
1990-1 C.B 12.
a. With respect to the "sale element", the
mortgagor will, on foreclosure, recognize taxable gain to the
extent that the fair market value of the property on the date of
foreclosure exceeds the mortgagor's adjusted basis in such
property. See Sec. 61(a)(3), I.R.C.
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b. With respect to the "debt cancellation
element", the mortgagor will, on foreclosure, recognize discharge
of indebtedness income to the extent that the outstanding debt
exceeds the fair market value of the property (assuming the
mortgagee releases the mortgagor from liability). Sec.
61(a) (12), I.R.C. See also Reg. §1.1001-2(c), Example (8).
(1) The rule requiring the recognition of
discharge income is subject to the bankruptcy exception under
Sec. 108(a)(1) (A), I.R.C., and the insolvency exception under
Sec. 108(a)(1)(B), I.R.C.
(2) For example, in Rev. Rul. 90-16, 1990-1
C.B. 12, an insolvent mortgagor who transferred real property
with an adjusted basis of $8,000 and a fair market value of
$10,000 to the mortgagee in satisfaction of a $12,000 recourse
debt recognized capital gain of $2,000 (that is, the difference
between the property's fair market value of $10,000 and the
mortgagor's basis of $8,000). However, although the mortgagor
realized $2,000 of discharge of indebtedness income (that is, the
difference between the $12,000 debt and the property's $10,000
fair market value), such amount was nontaxable under the
insolvency exception of Sec. 108(a)(1)(B), I.R.C.
3. The taxpayer will recognize a loss- (capital, Sec.
1231 or Sec. 1221 loss, depending on the nature of the asset in
the taxpayer's hands) if the adjusted basis of the transferred
property is greater than the debt encumbering such property at
the time of disposition. See, generally, Fogel and Allison,
Planning to Allow Both Parties to Control Tax Consequences of a
Real Estate Foreclosure, 12 Tax. for Law. 48 (1983).
a. While Sec. 1231 losses are ordinary losses,
such losses must first be netted against Sec. 1231 gains.
(1) Sec. 1231(c), I.R.C. was added to the
Code to prevent manipulation by taxpayers who could bunch sales
of appreciated trade or business assets in one taxable year and
sales of similar but decreased value property in a different
taxable year, thus maximizing the capital gains and ordinary
losses. See General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1984,
prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, at 547.
See, generally, Harmelink and Copeland, Section 1231 Transaction
Planning: The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, 63 Taxes 489
(1985); and Cash, The Erosion of Section 1231, 62 Taxes 789
(1984).
(2) The 1984 Tax Reform Act significantly
impacted this netting process. For taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1984, a taxpayer's net Sec. 1231 gain is treated as
ordinary income to the extent that such gain does not exceed the
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taxpayer's aggregate amount of net Sec. 1231 losses for the five
most recent preceding taxable years. Sec. 1231(c), I.R.C. Thus,
if a taxpayer had net Sec. 1231 losses during the five preceding
years, Sec. 1231(c) effectively requires the taxpayer to net such
past losses with the current net Sec. 1231 gain by recapturing
such losses to the extent of the current gain.
b. A taxpayer who is personally liable under
recourse debt is generally held not to have sustained a
deductible loss merely by abandoning the property.
(1) There must be either a subsequent
foreclosure or a voluntary conveyance because these events cut
off the taxpayer's interest in the property.
(2) When one of these events has occurred, a
sale or exchange has taken place; therefore, the taxpayer has
experienced the necessary taxable event which gives rise to the
loss. See Comm'r v. Green, 126 F.2d 70 (CA3 1942) (holding that
the subsequent foreclosure sale, rather than the abandonment, of
real property encumbered by a recourse mortgage was the event
which cut off the mortgagor's interest in the property; ac-
cordingly, such sale was the appropriate event upon which the
taxpayer could recognize a loss). See also Priv. Ltr. Rul.
8649051 (September 10, 1986) (where the Service noted that, in.
the case of recourse debt, a recognition event occurs only at the
time of the foreclosure sale or other event which formally
evidences the mortgagee's intent not to pursue collection of the
debt; however, in the case of nonrecourse debt, a recognition
event could arise upon the mortgagor's abandonment of the
mortgaged property).
C. Nonrecourse Debt.
1. Upon the foreclosure of property encumbered by
nonrecourse debt (that is, debt for which the taxpayer is not
personally liable), the property is deemed to be sold for the
outstanding balance of the nonrecourse debt, irrespective of the
fair market value of such property. Reg. §1.1001-2(b). See also
Woodson Associates, Inc. v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 649 (1951), aff'd 198
F.2d 357 (CA2 1952); and Lutz & Schram Co. v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 682
(1943).
2. Although historical at this time, it is
interesting to note that some commentators thought (or at least
contended) that footnote 37 of the Crane case (Crane v. Comm'r,
331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947), which reads as follows:
"Obviously, if the value of the property is less than
the amount of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not
personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the
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mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be
encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or
transferred it subject to the mortgage without
receiving boot. That is not this case."
justified limiting the maximum amount of the taxpayer's gain to
the fair market value of the property over the taxpayer's basis
in the property, regardless of the face amount of the mortgage
debt, since such amount represented the unrecognized gain
actually inherent in the property. See, e.q., Adams, Exploring
the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine: An Imaginary Supreme
Court Opinion, 21 Tax L. Rev. 159 (1966). Unfortunately for the
taxpayers, as discussed below, this theory did not prevail (and,
indeed, never should have prevailed).
a. In Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214, the
Service first attempted squarely to face the issue reserved in
footnote 37 of Crane. In that Ruling, the taxpayer purchased a
herd of cattle for breeding purposes by paying the seller a small
amount of cash and giving the seller a nonrecourse note for the
balance of the purchase price. The taxpayer also pledged the
herd as collateral for the unpaid mortgage debt. The taxpayer
transferred the herd to the seller three years later in
satisfaction of the unpaid nonrecourse note. At the time of this
transfer, the fair market value of the herd was less than the
mortgage liability. The Service held that the taxpayer had to
recognize gain equal to the amount of the unpaid mortgage debt in
excess of the taxpayer's adjusted basis for the property, even
though the value of the property was less than the mortgage debt.
b. Soon thereafter, the Tax Court followed the
Service's lead and held that, where a taxpayer voluntarily
conveyed property subject to a nonrecourse mortgage debt in
satisfaction of such debt, the fair market value of the property
at the time of such disposition was irrelevant in determining the
gain on the disposition. Millar v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 656 (1977),
aff'd on this issue 577 F.2d 212 (CA6 1978). See, generally,
Halpern, Footnote 37 and the Crane Case: The Problem That Never
Really Was, 6 J. Real Est. Tax. 197 (1979).
c. Finally, the issue was resolved in Comm'r v.
Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983), where the Supreme Court held that the
amount of gain attributable to liabilities forgiven was not
limited to the fair market value of the property.
(1) The Court pointed out that a taxpayer
does not have income upon the receipt of the proceeds of a
nonrecourse loan, and that the taxpayer is allowed to include
such proceeds in basis because the taxpayer has undertaken an
obligation to repay; as a consequence, the taxpayer, when
relieved of the obligation to repay such loan, must include the
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full amount of such debt relief in its amount realized regardless
of the fair market value of the underlying property, because the
extinguishment of the obligation produced value to the taxpayer.
(2) The Court went on to determine that the
only difference between recourse and nonrecourse financing is to
shift the risk of a decline in the property's value to the
mortgagee; therefore, the use of nonrecourse financing should not
affect the mortgagor's tax consequences. Comm'r v. Tufts, 461
U.S. 300, 311-312 (1983). See also Cunningham, Payment of Debt
with Property -- The Two-Step Analysis after Commissioner v.
Tufts, 38 Tax Lawyer 575 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court
should have accepted Justice O'Connor's bifurcation theory, which
breaks a Tufts-like transaction into its two separate components
-- a taxable disposition of property and a separately taxable
discharge of debt); Dorr and Lacy, Crane After Tufts: Still Some
Unanswered Questions, 62 Taxes 162 (1984); and Young, Tufts:
pursuant to a foreclosure. Footnote to Crane, 62 Taxes 118
(1984).
d. The rule established in Tufts requiring the
realization of indebtedness income in the full amount of the
nonrecourse debt forgiven or eliminated upon the disposition of
the underlying property applies equally to cash settlements or
other negotiated agreements in which the mortgagor does not
surrender the collateral. See Gershkowitz v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 984
(1987); but see, for a variation, Newman Estate v. Comm'r, 934
F.2d 426 (CA2 1991), rev'g 59 TCM 543 (1990).
3. If the adjusted basis of the transferred property
is greater than the balance of the nonrecourse debt encumbering
such property, the taxpayer will recognize a loss (either
capital, Sec. 1221 or Sec. 1231 loss). See Russo v. Comm'r, 68
T.C. 135 (1977).
a. If the property is transferred to the
mortgagee voluntarily in lieu of foreclosure, and the adjusted
basis is in excess of the amount of the mortgage debt, at one
time the courts held that the taxpayer had incurred an ordinary
loss rather than a capital loss, on the theory that no sale or
exchange had occurred. See Stokes v. Comm'r, 124 F.2d 335 (CA3
1941); Polin v. Comm'r, 114 F.2d 174 (CA3 1940); and
Commonwealth, Inc. v. Comm'r, 36 B.T.A. 850 (1937). However,
where the taxpayer received some (even de minimis) consideration
for conveying the property, then the taxpayer had a capital loss
because a sale or exchange was considered to have occurred. See
Blum v. Comm'r, 133 F.2d 447 (CA2 1943) (where a nominal payment
by the transferee to the transferor's lawyer resulted in a
"sale", so that capital loss was recognized).
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b. The Service began to contend that the
difference between a foreclosure and a voluntary conveyance of a
deed in lieu thereof was "too tenuous" to warrant any substantive
difference in tax treatment. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7744006 (July 5,
1977).
(1) Soon thereafter, the Service ruled that
a loss on a voluntary conveyance in lieu of foreclosure was a
capital loss. Rev. Rul. 78-164, 1978-1 C.B. 264.
(2) The Tax Court followed the Service's
lead and held that a voluntary conveyance in lieu of foreclosure,
where the debt was nonrecourse, was a "sale", so that any loss
was a capital loss. Freeland v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 970 (1980). In
Freeland, the Court also stated that, to the extent prior
opinions such as Commonwealth, Inc. v. Comm'r, 36 B.T.A. 850
(1937), were inconsistent with its holding in Freeland, it would
"no longer adhere" to its prior opinions. See also Laport v.
Comm'r, 671 F.2d 1628 (CA7 1982); and Hope v. Comm'r, 42 TCM 224
(1981).
(3) Recently, the Tax Court stated that,
"[i]t is now well settled that the transfer of property by deed
in lieu of foreclosure constitutes a 'sale or exchange'." Allan
v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 655 (1986). See Ebben v. Comm'r, 783 F.2d 906
(CA9 1986) (holding that a transfer of encumbered property to
charity constituted a "sale or exchange" for purposes of Sec.
1011(b), I.R.C.
c. Generally, when property subject to a
nonrecourse mortgage is abandoned, such abandonment will be
treated as a sale or exchange. See Schmudde, Real Estate
Investments: Foreclosure and Abandonment of Mortgaged Property, 3
J. Tax. Invests. 245 (1986).
(1) Under earlier law, if the taxpayer had
an adjusted basis in the property exceeding the mortgage debt,
then the taxpayer could recognize an ordinary loss, provided he
could prove both worthlessness of equity and, by some clearly
identifiable event, abandonment in the year for which the
deduction was claimed. See Hoffman v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 459
(1939), aff'd 117 F.2d 987 (CA2 1941); and Daily v. Comm'r, 81
T.C. 161 (1983) (where, at footnote 4, the Court noted that there
would be ordinary loss on abandonment because the property was
trade or business property, so that Sec. 1231, I.R.C. was
applicable). See also Regs. §§i.165-2(a) and 1.167(a)-8(a) (4)
(dealing with the issue of when abandonment occurs). See,
generally, Cook, Abandonment of Property Can Convert Capital Loss
into Ordinary Loss, 7 Tax. for Law. 168 (1978).
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(2) However, current law, based on the
Freeland decision, treats an abandonment as a "sale or exchange".
(a) Thus, abandonment losses will
generally be capital losses. See Middleton v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.
310 (1981), aff'd 693 F.2d 124 (CAll 1982). See also Yarbro v.
Comm'r, 45 TCM 170 (1982), aff'd 732 F.2d 479 (CA5 1984) (holding
that, on abandonment by a joint venture of its property, capital
loss was recognized under Sec. 165(f), I.R.C.); and Arkin v.
Comm'r, 76 T.C. 1048 (1981) (capital loss recognized under Sec.
165(f), I.R.C. on abandonment constitutes a "sale or exchange"
for purposes of Sec. 1011(b), I.R.C.). But see Citron v. Comm'r,
97 T.C. _, No. 12 (1991) (abandonment loss resulting from a
partner's renunciation of his interest in a partnership in which
no liabilities existed was an ordinary loss in the year of the
partnership's dissolution).
(b) Note that, as a general matter, an
abandonment may be difficult to prove, in the absence of an
easily ascertainable event. As an illustration, see Equity
Planning Corp. and Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 45 TCM 610 (1983)
(where abandonment was found not to have occurred because the
partnership continued its efforts, which eventually were
successful, to retrieve value from its investment).
(c) On the other hand, see Echols v.
Comm'r, 953 F.2d 703 (CA5 1991), rev'g 93 T.C. 553 (1989)
(taxpayer's statement to other partner that he would make no
additional capital contributions to the partnership was a "clear
and unequivocal indication to [the other partner] and the world"
that the taxpayer was "walking from his ownership interest").
(3) If the abandoned property is encumbered
by a nonrecourse mortgage debt and the taxpayer's basis in the
real property is less than the outstanding mortgage debt, the
taxpayer will have gain to the extent of such difference.
Because an abandonment has been held to be a "sale or exchange",
such gain will be capital gain, subject, again, to the recapture
rules, unless the property fails to constitute a capital asset
with respect to the taxpayer.
D. Timing of Mortgagor's Tax Consequences.
1. A loss on foreclosure is deductible in the year in
which, under state law, the taxpayer's right of redemption
expires. See Derby Realty Corp. v. Comm'r, 35 B.T.A. 335 (1937).
a. If there is no right of redemption, the
deduction is taken in the year of the foreclosure sale, rather
than in the year of the final decree. See Belcher v. Comm'r, 24
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TCM 1 (1965). See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8649051 (September 10,
1986) (ruling that the foreclosure sale itself, not the decree of
foreclosure that precedes the sale, fixes the time when the
taxpayer recognizes gain or loss under Sec. 1001, I.R.C.).
b. In addition, if the debtor wants a deduction
in the year of foreclosure and has a right of redemption, he may
voluntarily quitclaim his right to the same in order to obtain
the deduction. See Hill v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 376 (1939).
2. If there is a voluntary conveyance in lieu of
foreclosure or abandonment, the loss is taken in the year such
voluntary conveyance or abandonment occurs. See Hoffman v.
Comm'r, 117 F.2d 982 (CA2 1941).
IV. MORTGAGEE'S TAX CONSEQUENCES ON ACQUISITION OF THE PROPERTY.
A. Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure.
1. A mortgagee to whom property is conveyed
voluntarily will recognize gain (or loss) to the extent that the
transferred property's fair market value is greater (or less)
than the mortgagee's basis for the cancelled mortgage debt. See,
e.g., Henry v. U.S., 180 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
2. The character of such gain or loss depends upon
whether the mortgage debt is a capital asset in the mortgagee's
hands.
a. Originally, the courts held that such gain or
loss was ordinary in character because it was believed that no
sale or exchange had occurred in the deed in lieu of foreclosure
context. See Humphrey v. Comm'r, 162 F.2d 853 (CA5 1947).
b. However, it is now clear that the transfer of
property by a deed in lieu of foreclosure constitutes a sale or
exchange with respect to the mortgagor. See Freeland v. Comm'r,
74 T.C. 970 (1980). See also Allan v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 655, 659
(1986).
c. It would certainly be incongruous, with
respect to the same transaction, to treat the mortgagor as if a
sale or exchange had occurred and yet treat the mortgagee as if
no sale or exchange had occurred. Since it is proper to view the
mortgagee as having cancelled the mortgage debt in exchange for
conveyance of the property, the character of any gain or loss
recognized by the mortgagee will depend upon whether the mortgage
debt is a capital asset in the mortgagee's hands. See Sec. 1221,
I.R.C. See also Rev. Rul. 80-57, 1980-1 C.B. 157 (holding that a
real estate investment trust had ordinary income upon the
cancellation of a mortgage debt in exchange for the mortgaged
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property because the mortgage debt was not a capital asset in the
hands of the real estate investment trust).
B. Foreclosure.
1. If the mortgagee forecloses, and the property is
sold for less than the amount of the debt, and there is an
uncollectible deficiency, the mortgagee has a bad debt deduction
to the extent that the basis for the debt exceeds the bid price.
Reg. §1.166-6(a).
a. There should be capital gain or loss equal to
the difference between (1) the mortgagee's basis for so much of
the debtor's obligations as are applied to the purchase price and
(2) the fair market value of the property. Reg. §1.166-6(b).
See Nichols v. Comm'r, 141 F.2d 870 (CA6 1944).
b. But see Community Bank v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 503
(1974) (where the Service argued that such gain was ordinary
income); and Rev. Rul. 80-56, 1980-1 C.B. 154 (where the Service
ruled that any gain which offsets a bad debt deduction under Reg.
§1.166-6(a) (1) is taxable as ordinary income even if the mortgage
note is a capital asset).
2. The fair market value for purposes of this
determination is, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to
the contrary, presumed to be the amount for which the property is
bid in by the mortgagee. Reg. §1.166-6(b)(2).
a. Illustrative of this point is Community Bank
v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 503 (1974), where the mortgagee foreclosed on
properties on which the aggregate balance due was approximately
$861,000. At the foreclosure sales, the mortgagee acquired such
properties for an aggregate cost of $371,000. The mortgagee
claimed a bad debt deduction of $490,000, the difference between
the basis for the debt and the bid price.
(1) The Service argued that the mortgagee
had gain to the extent of the differential between the fair
market value and the bid price.
(2) The Court held, however, that there was
no gain realized by the mortgagee because the bid price was
presumed equal to the fair market value, inasmuch as the Service
presented "no evidence to indicate that the presumption does not
apply." Community Bank v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 503, 507-8 (1974).
But see.Rev. Rul. 72-238, 1972-1 C.B. 65 (where the fair market
value was held to be in excess of the bid price where so
determined by qualified appraisers). See also Community Bank v.
Comm'r, 79 T.C. 789 (1982) (holding that the Service may seek to
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rebut the presumption that fair market value is equal to the bid
price).
3. Where the mortgagee forecloses, but a third party
purchases the property at the foreclosure sale, the difference
between the purchase price and the basis may be allowable as an
ordinary loss deduction, rather than as a capital loss. See
Havemever v. Comm'r, 45 B.T.A. 329 (1941). See also Reg.
§1.166-6(a) (1).
4. If the mortgagee is entitled to a bad debt
deduction, such deduction is allowable in the year of
worthlessness. Regs. §§1.166-6, 1.166-3.
a. Accordingly, such debt becomes worthless in
the year of the foreclosure sale.
b. However, if there is a right of redemption,
the bad debt is not deductible until the year in which the sale
becomes absolute and indefeasible. But see Securities MortgaQe
Co. v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 667 (1972) (where the bad debt was held
deductible in the year of foreclosure even though there was a
right of redemption because in economic reality there was no
chance that the redemption rights could be exercised by anyone
holding an interest adverse to the mortgagee).
c. If the property is transferred voluntarily to
the mortgagee, then the loss is deductible in the year of the
transfer.
C. Exception for Seller Reacquisitions under Sec. 1038.
1. Generally, when a purchaser under a purchase money
mortgage defaults, the seller, either by foreclosure or by
voluntary conveyance of a deed in lieu of foreclosure, reacquires
the property formerly owned. In situations where the value of
the real property at the time of the reacquisition is greater
than the seller's adjusted basis for the mortgage debt in
default, Sec. 1038, I.R.C. determines the tax consequences.
2. Sec. 1038 was spurred by the belief that it was
inequitable to tax the seller when he was really in no better
position to pay tax after the foreclosure than before. S. Rep.
No. 1361, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), found at 1964-2 C.B.
828-835.
a. Instead of the repossession of the property
being treated as a second sale of the property back to its
original holder, it was viewed by Congress as more desirable to
consider instead that the first sale had been nullified and to
limit the gain upon reacquisition to the payments actually
1615TR03 . 2G - 30 -
received. S. Rep. No. 1361, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), found
at 1964-2 C.B. 828-835.
b. The rationale behind Sec. 1038 is that to tax
the seller at reacquisition would have undesirable results. For
example, if the property has increased in value, any tax imposed
would be a tax on a gain not yet realized; on the other hand, if
the property has decreased in value, any tax imposed would be a
tax on a gain which might never be realized.
3. In general, Sec. 1038 applies where a sale of real
property results in seller acceptance of a promissory note from
the buyer which is secured by the real property sold, and the
seller subsequently reacquires such real property in partial or
full satisfaction of such indebtedness. Sec. 1038(a), I.R.C.;
Reg. §1.1038-1(a). In such cases, generally no gain or loss
(which, but for Sec. 1038, would be measured, in accordance with
Sec. 1001, I.R.C., by the difference between the fair market
value of the property and the seller's basis in the indebtedness)
will result to the seller on such reacquisition. Sec. 1038(a),
I.R.C.; Reg. §1.1038-1(a).
4. Several overriding concepts are to be found under
the umbrella of this general rule.
a. Sec. 1038 applies only to real property, and
not to personal property. Sec. 1038(a), I.R.C.; Reg.
S1.1038-1(a)(1). See Held v. U.S., 75-2 U.S.T.C. 9,678 (D. Ala.
1975), where the Court found that Sec. 1038 was not applicable
because corporate stock rather than real property had been sold.
See also Rev. Rul. 86-120, 1986-2 C.B. 145, holding that Sec.
1038 did not apply to a shareholder who received an installment
obligation from a corporation in a Sec. 337 liquidation when that
shareholder, upon buyer's default, subsequently received the real
property used to secure the obligation, because the liquidated
corporation, not the former shareholder, was the seller of the
real property for purposes of Sec. 1038.
b. Thus, if the property sold included elements
of both real property and personal property, it would be
necessary, upon reacquisition, to separate both the basis of the
personal property sold and the value of the personal property
reacquired, for there would be gain or loss resulting, under the
general income tax rules noted above, with respect to such
personalty.
c. A sale may occur even though title to the
property has not passed to the purchaser.
(1) A sale will be considered to have
occurred if the purchaser has contractual rights to retain pos-
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session of the property, so long as it performs its obligations
under the contract, and to obtain title upon completion of such
obligations. Reg. Si.1038-1(a)(2)(i).
(2) Moreover, a sale may have occurred even
if the purchaser does not have the right to possession until he
partially or fully satisfies the terms of the contract. For ex-
ample, if the seller contracts to sell property to the purchaser,
and under the contract the purchaser is to take possession of the
property when 10 percent of the purchase price is paid, but is
not to receive legal title until the full purchase price is paid,
a sale is considered to have occurred on the date of the
contract. Reg. §1.1038-1(a) (2) (i).
(3) While a "sale" may be deemed to have
occurred for purposes of Sec. 1038, I.R.C., the date of the
contract may not be the date that the holding period of the
property is considered to have commenced for capital gains pur-
poses, if the purchaser did not take on the burdens and benefits
with respect to the property on that date. See Rev. Rul. 54-607,
1954-1 C.B. 177. See also Hoven v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 50 (1971);
and Borrelli v. Comm'r, 31 TCM 876 (1972).
d. A disposition of real property which
constitutes an exchange of property will not be considered a
sale. Reg. §1.1038-1(a)(2)(i).
(1) Sec. 1038, I.R.C. does not apply to a
transaction treated as a sale under Sec. 121(d) (4) or 1034(i),
I.R.C.
(2) Nor does Sec. 1038 apply to a sale of
stock in a cooperative housing corporation described in Sec. 121
(d)(3) or 1034(f), I.R.C.
e. There must have been debt secured by the
property sold.
(1) This means that the seller must have the
right to take title or possession of the property, or both, if
there is a default with respect to the debt. Reg.
S1.1038-1(a) (2) (ii).
(2) However, there is no requirement that
the purchaser have any personal liability on the debt; rather,
the seller may be "limited in his recourse to the property for
payment of the indebtedness in the case of default." Reg.
§1.1038-1(a) (2) (ii).
5. Originally, the Service interpreted the word
"seller" as used in Sec. 1038(a) (2) to mean that the original
1615TR03.2G - 32 -
seller would be the only party who could reacquire the property
and receive the favorable treatment of Sec. 1038. See Rev. Rul.
69-83, 1969-1 C.B. 202, where the Service rejected the
applicability of Sec. 1038, I.R.C. to a decedent's estate because
the original seller died between the time of the sale and the
time of voluntary reconveyance of the property in lieu of
foreclosure.
a. In 1980 Congress, by enacting Sec. 1038(g),
extended the availability of Sec. 1038 to the estate or
beneficiary of a deceased seller.
b. Under Sec. 1038(g), I.R.C., this is only the
case where there is an installment obligation to which Sec.
691(a)(4)(B), I.R.C. applies.
c. The basis of the reacquired property is
increased by an amount equal to the Sec. 691(c) deduction that
would have been allowable with respect to the gain on the
exchange of the obligation for the real property. Sec.
1038(g) (2), I.R.C.
6. The reacquisition must be in partial or full
satisfaction of the debt. "That is, the reacquisition must be in
furtherance of the seller's security rights in the property with
respect to indebtedness to him that arose at the time of the
sale." Reg. §i.1038-1(a)(3)(i).
7. The manner in which the seller reacquires the real
property is generally immaterial. Reg. §1.1038-1(a) (3) (ii). The
property may be acquired either by agreement or by process of
law. Reg. §l.1038-i(a)(3)(ii).
8. There is no requirement that the property be
reacquired from the original purchaser, inasmuch as no mention is
made in Sec. 1038(a) of the "purchaser". Therefore, the property
may be reacquired from the purchaser's assignee or transferee or
from a trustee holding title to the property pending the
purchaser's satisfaction of the terms of the sales contract or
purchase money indebtedness, so long as, in any such event, the
debt partially or completely satisfied in the reacquisition arose
in the original sale and was secured by the property reacquired.
Reg. §1.1038-1(a) (4).
9. Sec. 1038 is mandatory. Reg. §1.1038-1(a) (1).
a. As to the election to apply Sec. 1038, I.R.C.
to certain taxable years beginning after December 31, 1957, but
before September 3, 1964, see Reg. §1.1038-3.
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b. If the requirements of Sec. 1038(a) are met,
then Sec. 1038 will automatically be applicable to the
reacquisition of the security property by the seller on the
cancellation of the debt. It is irrelevant whether the seller
realized a gain or a loss on the sale, or even whether it could
be ascertained at the time of the sale if gain or loss would
result from the sale.
10. While Secs. 1038(b) and 1038(d), I.R.C. set forth
the rules as to the recognition of gain in certain situations,
Sec. 1038(a), I.R.C. specifically provides that under no
circumstances will any loss be recognized where Sec. 1038 is
applicable. Thus, if it is desirable for the seller to recognize
a loss, one or more of the requirements of Sec. 1038 must be
broken. See Hassan v. Comm'r, 63 T.C. 175 (1974).
11. An exception is made to the general rule of
nonrecognition, based on the fact that when a reacquiring seller
has received payments prior to his reacquisition of the property,
requiring the seller to recognize gain would not result in
hardship since he is in a better position, both economically and
to pay tax, than he was before the reacquisition.
a. Thus, if the seller received part payment on
the selling price prior to the reacquisition, which was in excess
of the gain reported, tax is imposed at the time of
reacquisition. Reg. §1.1038-1(a)(1).
b. This would occur if the sale were reported on
the installment method or on the deferred-payment method.
c. Sec. 1038(b) (2) places a ceiling on the
amount of taxable gain as a result of reacquisition.
(1) In no event is the gain attributable to
payments received before repossession to exceed:
(a) The potential gain attributable to
the initial sale (that is, the amount by which the selling price
of the real property exceeded its adjusted basis in the hands of
the seller), reduced by
(b) The sum of (i) any amounts received
before repossession already reported as income (payments by the
buyer on a mortgage or other debt to which the property was
subject when acquired by the buyer are considered received by the
reacquiring seller before repossession pursuant to Reg. §1.1038-
l(b)(2)(i)) and (ii) the amount of money and the fair market
value of other property (except purchase money obligations of the
purchaser) paid or transferred by the seller in connection with
the reacquisition. Regs. §§1.1038-1(b) and (c).
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d. In determining the potential gain
attributable to the initial sale, the gross selling price is
reduced by selling commissions, legal fees and other expenses
incident to the sale. Sec. 1038(b)(2), I.R.C.; and Reg.
§1.1038-1(c)(3). See also Cramer v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 1125 (1971).
But see Greene v. Comm'r, 76 T.C. 1018 (1981) (taxpayer not
entitled to reduce capital gain by unpaid sales commissions and
selling expenses incurred at the time of the original sale).
e. EXAMPLE: Assume that the seller sold for
$300,000 an unencumbered property with an adjusted basis of
$200,000. Also assume that the purchaser paid for the property
by giving the seller $30,000 cash and executing a note in the
seller's favor for $270,000. The note was payable in nine equal
annual installments, together with interest on the unpaid
principal balance at 10%. Furthermore, assume that the
installment method of reporting applies; the purchaser defaults
on the note after making two annual payments; the seller
reacquires the property by voluntary conveyance in lieu of
foreclosure; and the seller pays $20,000 in connection with the
reacquisition. Upon sale, the seller has a realized, but not
recognized, gain of $100,000 ($300,000 selling price less
$200,000 adjusted basis). Also prior to the reacquisition the
seller has, excluding interest on the installment note, received
$90,000 in cash (the initial $30,000 and two annual payments of
$30,000 each) from the purchaser and recognized $30,000 of income
($90,000 received times one-third, the percentage of gain
inherent in each installment receipt). Upon reacquisition, the
seller's gain is limited to $50,000 (initial sales price,
$300,000, less initial adjusted basis, $200,000, previously
reported gain, $30,000, and money paid in connection with
reacquisition, $20,000). Thus, this limitation of gain rule
takes into account both the original gain realized upon the sale
and the costs associated with the reacquisition.
12. In many situations, the purchase money mortgage
debt will not be the only encumbrance on the property. For
example, at the time of the sale the purchase money mortgage may
have been subordinated to a newly placed first mortgage debt to
an institutional lender. When the property is reacquired, and
such first mortgage is assumed or taken subject to by the seller,
the unpaid balance of the first mortgage, so long as the first
mortgage did not arise when the seller owned the property, will
be treated as money paid by the seller on the reacquisition,
thereby increasing basis. Reg. §l.1038-1(c)(4)(ii). See,
generally, Keatinge and Roche, The Silver Lining in the
Wraparound Mortgage Rule -- Free Basis on Foreclosure under
Section 1038, 64 Taxes 505 (1986).
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13. The rules governing the basis to the seller of the
reacquired property are designed to provide the symmetry typical
of nonrecognition provisions.
a. The basis is adjusted so that gain or loss
not currently recognized on the disposition of the purchase
obligation is recognized on later disposition of the reacquired
property.
b. This is accomplished by requiring that the
reacquired property take a substitute basis -- namely, the basis
for the purchase money obligation. See Anderson v. Comm'r, 64
T.C. 560 (1975).
c. To prevent double taxation, this substituted
basis is then increased to reflect the gain reported on the
reacquisition and any money or other property, at its fair market
value, paid by the reacquiring seller. Sec. 1038(c), I.R.C.;
Reg. §1.1038-1(g) (1).
14. The Regulations, pointing out that the
reacquisition is "in a sense considered a nullification of the
original sale of the real property" (Reg. §1.1038-1(g) (3)),
provide for the tacking of holding periods.
a. The holding period for the reacquired
property is therefore deemed to include the period during which
the seller held it prior to the original sale.
b. However, the holding period does not include
the period between the date of the original sale and the date of
the reacquisition. Reg. §1.1038-1(g)(3).
c. If the purchaser made improvements to the
property, the reacquisition produces two holding periods for the
seller.
(1) Tacking is permitted for the portion of
the property not improved by the purchaser; however, the holding
period of the improved portion is not tacked but is limited to
the period beginning with the date of reacquisition. See Smith
v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 874 (1972).
(2) See also Conners v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 541
(1987), where the Service permitted improvements to be reacquired
by the taxpayers without gain by reason of Sec. 1038, I.R.C., but
noted that the improvements would have a zero basis in their
hands, as well as a separate and new holding period.
161STR03.2G - 36 -
(3) A separate holding period for
improvements would also be required if they were constructed by
the seller after the reacquisition.
15. The Code does not specify whether gain resulting
from a reacquisition is capital gain or ordinary income. The
Regulations fill this gap with complex and somewhat illogical
rules, as follows:
a. If the original sale was reported under the
installment method, then the character of the gain is capital if
the property is a capital asset or used in the taxpayer's trade
or business. Reg. §1.1038-1(d).
b. If the original sale was reported as a
deferred-payment sale, the character of the gain is artificially
made to depend on whether title was transferred.
(1) On the one hand, if the seller retained
title, the gain is capital gain.
(2) On the other hand, if title was
transferred to the purchaser and there is a voluntary
reconveyance, the gain is taxed as ordinary income if the pur-
chaser was an individual, but as capital gain if. the purchaser
was a corporation whose obligations are satisfied by the
reacquisition of corporate securities. Reg. §1.1038-1(d).
16. No bad debt deduction is allowed as a result of
the reacquisition. Reg. §1.1038-1(f) (1).
a. Moreover, if the seller claimed a deduction
for the complete or partial worthlessness of the purchaser's
obligation prior to the reacquisition, the deduction must be
"reversed" upon the reacquisition.
b. Under Sec. 1038(d), I.R.C. the seller
realizes income on the reacquisition equal to the amount of the
prior bad debt deduction, and the adjusted basis of the
indebtedness is increased, as of the date of reacquisition, by a
like amount. Reg. §1.1038-1(f) (2).
c. However, the taxability of the restored
income is limited by the "tax benefit" rule of Sec. 11, I.R.C.
Reg. §1.1038-1(f) (2).
17. Finally, if the property sold was the seller's
principal residence, gain on the sale may have been avoided by a
timely replacement (Sec. 1038(e) (1) (A), I.R.C.; Reg. §1.1038-2)
or gain may have been excluded, even without a replacement, if
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the seller was 55 years of age or older. Sec. 1038(e) (1) (B),
I.R.C.
a. The relief provisions providing for such
nonrecognition will be overridden under Sec. 1038(e), I.R.C.
unless the seller resells the property within one year after the
reacquisition. Reg. §l.1038-2(a)(1). See, generally, Burke and
Friel, Reacquisitions of Seller-Financed Real Property:
Evaluating Section 1038, 13 Rev. Tax. Indivs. 107 (1989).
b. If the residence is resold within the
one-year period, the resale basically receives the same treatment
as the original sale, with corresponding adjustments to the
adjusted sales price and basis to account for the effect of the
prior sale and reacquisition. Reg. §1.1038-2. See also Lohman
v. Comm'r, 56 TCM 1600 (1989), wherein a taxpayer who sold a
ground lease to a subtenant was required to add rental payments
made on behalf of the subtenant to his adjusted basis for
purposes of calculating potential gain on the resale of the
lease. The court rejected the taxpayer's position that such
lease payments were deductible under Sec. 212, I.R.C. as an
ordinary and necessary expense incurred for the conservation of
an income-producing property.
D. Exception for Rescission of the Transaction.
1. If the reacquisition is in the same year as the
sale, and no consideration is paid by the purchaser, it may be
possible to treat the reacquisition as a rescission of the prior
sale. The Service has ruled that the rescission of a prior sale
during the same taxable year negates the original sale, so that
no gain or loss is realized. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7802003
(September 28, 1977). See also Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181;
and Branum v. Campbell, 211 F.2d 147 (CAS 1954), holding that a
sale of a partnership interest was taxable, even though the
interest was repurchased in the year of sale (however, note that
the taxpayer did not argue that the transaction had been
rescinded).
2. The Service has also ruled that a rescission in a
later year is a realization transaction. See Priv. Ltr. Rul.
8210015 (November 23, 1981).
E. ReportinQ Requirements upon Reaccruisition by Mortgagee.
1. A mortgagor which reacquires property in
satisfaction of any indebtedness thereon is required to file IRS
Form 1099-A in the year the transfer takes place. Sec. 6050J,
I.R.C. The information contained on Form 1099-A includes the
classification of the debt as recourse or nonrecourse and, if
recourse, the portion that is allocable to the "sale element" of
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the transaction and the portion allocable to the "debt
cancellation element".
2. The penalty for failure to file Form 1099-A is $50
for each return. See Sec. 6721, I.R.C.
V. SPECIAL TAX ISSUES IN RESTRUCTURING REAL ESTATE
PARTNERSHIPS.
A. Reduction or Other Modification of Partnership
Indebtedness.
1. Unless otherwise excepted, a partnership will
recognize cancellation of indebtedness income upon the reduction
or other material modification of partnership indebtedness. Sec.
61(a)(12), I.R.C.
2. As with other partnership items, discharge of
indebtedness income is generally allocated to the partners in
accordance with the allocation provisions set forth in the
partnership agreement, provided such allocation has "substantial
economic effect". Sec. 704(b), I.R.C.; Reg. §1.704-1(b).
a. If the cancellation of indebtedness income is
allocated to the partners in the same ratio as the discharged
debt is shared under Sec. 752, I.R.C., any increase in a
partner's basis from the allocation of such income would be
offset by a corresponding deemed distribution under Sec. 752(b),
I.R.C. Secs. 705(a) (1) and 752(b), I.R.C. See S. Rep. No. 1035,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 21 (1980).
b. However, in the case of partnership recourse
debt, differences may arise if the partnership cancellation of
indebtedness income is allocated under Sec. 704(b), I.R.C. in a
manner different from the percentages in which partners share
debt. [Note, partnership recourse debt is allocated to the
partners who bear "economic risk of loss", as set forth in Prop.
Reg. §1.752-2(a).]
(1) As a result of any such allocation, a
partner without economic risk of loss with respect to the debt,
and therefore lacking basis therein, may recognize phantom
income.
(2) Simultaneously, a partner bearing
economic risk of loss on discharged debt may recognize gain under
Sec. 731(a) (1), I.R.C. to the extent that the Sec. 752 deemed
distribution exceeds his share of partnership discharge of
indebtedness income.
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3. The provisions of Secs. 108(a), (b) and (g),
I.R.C. regarding cancellation of indebtedness income are applied
at the partner level rather than at the partnership level. Sec.
108(d) (6), I.R.C., overruling Stackhouse v. Comm'r, 441 F.2d 465
(CA5 1971) (which held that the discharge of partnership
indebtedness resulted in a decrease in partnership liabilities
under Sec. 752(b), I.R.C., rather than partnership income). (See
Newman Estate v. Comm'r, 934 F.2d 426 (CA2 1991), rev'g 59 TCM
543 (1990), under which the Court applied the insolvency
exception at the partnership level with respect to partnership
cancellation of indebtedness income which arose prior to the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980.)
a. Income from the discharge of partnership
indebtedness is allocated to the partners as a separate item
under Sec. 702(a), I.R.C. to allow each partner to apply the
provisions of Sec. 108, I.R.C. separately at the partner level.
b. The bankruptcy or insolvency of the
partnership does not allow a partner which is both solvent and
outside Title 11 to exclude its vro rata share of the
partnership's discharge of indebtedness income.
c. It is unclear whether certain exceptions to
the recognition of discharge of indebtedness income under Sec.
108, I.R.C. should be applied at the partnership or partner
level, including the purchase money debt exception (Sec.
108(e)(5), I.R.C.) and the lost deduction exception (Sec.
108(e)(2), I.R.C.). See, generally, Mason, Resnick & Smith,
Restructuring of Partnership Debt Need Not Result in Income
Recognition, 74 J. Tax. 312 (May 1991); and Sheffield & Maynes,
Selected Tax Issues in Partnership Debt Restructurings, 68 Taxes
861 (December 1990).
(1) If the exceptions are applied at the
partnership level, the partnership would recognize no discharge
of indebtedness income. However, the decrease in each partner's
share of partnership liabilities would produce a deemed Sec.
752(b) distribution which could ultimately create phantom income
for the partners. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8429001 (March 12, 1984)
(the Service applied the purchase money debt exception at the
partnership level).
(2) If the exceptions are applied at the
partner level, the partnership's discharge of indebtedness income
would be allocated to the partners, who would then apply the
exception individually. This treatment would allow each partner
to increase his basis to the extent of the income allocated and
thereby avoid phantom income. See Newman Estate v. Comm'r, 934
F.2d 426 (CA2 1991), rev'g 59 TCM 543 (1990).
1615TR03.2G - 40 -
B. Admission of New Money Partner.
1. The admission of a new partner with fresh capital
to pay down or eliminate existing partnership debt typically
requires an adjustment of profit and loss percentages and other
partnership items through an amendment to the partnership
agreement.
2. The tax implications of admitting a new money
partner depend on a number of factors, including whether the new
capital will be used to repay existing partnership debt rather
than for another partnership purpose and whether such debt is
recourse or nonrecourse.
a. If the existing partnership debt is
nonrecourse and all or any portion thereof is repaid, the
existing partners may be required to recognize gain to the extent
of any deemed distributions in excess of their basis. Secs.
731(a) (1) and 752(b), I.R.C.; and Prop. Reg. §1.752-2(f). See
also Rev. Rul. 84-102, 1984-2 C.B. 119.
b. In addition to the Sec. 752 deemed
distribution, the reduction of the partnership nonrecourse debt
may cause a "minimum gain chargeback" to the existing partners.
(1) Generally, a "minimum gain chargeback"
is an allocation of income or gain to a partner to the extent of
the greater of his share of any net decrease in "partnership
minimum gain" or the deficit balance in such partner's capital
account. Reg. §l.704-lT(b) (iv) (e).
(2) For this purpose, "partnership minimum
gain" is defined, with respect to each nonrecourse liability, as
the amount of gain which would be realized by the partnership if
it disposed of partnership property encumbered by the nonrecourse
liability. Reg. §l.704-1T(b) (iv) (c).
c. In order to avoid the allocation of
partnership minimum gain to the existing partners, the
partnership may elect to revalue the partnership assets to
account for any differences between tax basis and book value of
such property. Sec. 704(c), I.R.C.
(1) The "book-up" treats the book basis of
the partnership assets as being at least equal to the nonrecourse
indebtedness securing such property and, therefore, any
partnership minimum gain prior to the revaluation would be
reduced to zero. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2) (iv) (f).
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(2) Furthermore, by restating the capital
accounts of the existing partners to zero, any minimum gain
chargeback to them can be avoided.
d. If the partnership elects not to book-up its
assets upon admitting a new partner and does not reduce the
partnership debt, the tax consequences would be beneficial to the
existing partners and detrimental to the new money partner.
(1) With respect to the existing partners,
any minimum gain attributable thereto would remain intact and
thereby avoid any minimum gain chargeback. Also, the existing
partners may avoid the recognition of gain under Sec. 731(a)(1),
I.R.C.
(2) With respect to the new money partner,
allocations of partnership taxable income (loss) may be greater
(less) than if the partnership had revalued its assets.
C. Admission of Lender as Partner.
1. Generally, the exchange of partnership debt for an
interest in the partnership appears to be nontaxable to both the
creditor partner and the partnership.
a. The contribution of the debt by the lender
partner is considered a contribution of property which is
nontaxable under Sec. 721, I.R.C. See McKee, Nelson and
Whitmire, Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners, 14.02[3]
(2d ed. 1990). But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8117210 (January 30,
1981) (the Service stated that the applicability of Sec. 721 to a
contribution of debt is under consideration). Compare, in the
corporate context, Rev. Rul. 91-47, 1991-35 I.R.B. 4.
b. The creditor partner would receive a basis in
his partnership interest equal to his basis in the debt
contributed. Sec. 722, I.R.C.
2. The exchange or contribution of a nonrecourse loan
by a partnership creditor may have an adverse impact on the
existing partners.
a. Upon the admission of a new partner, the
profit and loss allocation percentages would require adjustment,
which could result in deemed distributions to the existing
partners in excess of basis and the recognition of taxable gain.
Secs. 731(a) (1) and 752(b), I.R.C.
b. Based on the nonrecourse nature of the loan,
minimum gain would be decreased, thereby triggering minimum gain
chargeback and the existing partners would be allocated income to
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eliminate their negative capital accounts. Reg. §1.704-
1T(b) (4) (iv) (e) (2).
c. A nonrecourse debt contributed by the lender
in exchange for a partnership interest would be recharacterized
as "partner nonrecourse debt" for which only the lender would
bear economic risk of loss. See Reg. §l.704-lT(b) (4) (iv) (k) (4)
(1) All deductions and other tax incidents
attributable to the.partner nonrecourse debt would be allocated
to the lender partner, which could result in deemed distributions
to the existing partners. Sec. 752(b), I.R.C.; and Reg. §1.704-
1T(b) (4) (iv) (h).
(2) As an exception, under Prop. Regs. §§1-
752-2(d) (1) and (2), the nonrecourse debt contributed by the
lender partner would retain its nonrecourse character if the
lender partner's interest in each item of income, gain, loss or
deduction is ten percent (10%) or less and the loan constitutes
qualified nonrecourse financing under Sec. 465(b) (6), I.R.C. See
Prop. Reg. §1.752-2(f), Example 5.
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